According to a recent study end of March by Danish Center for Terror Analysis (CTA) under PET/Danish Security and Intelligence Service, the social media like Facebook and YouTube are used to radicalise young people to a higher and higher extent. By making use of support groups, spreading files, etc. A very open and social approach, it would appear.
In Denmark, another study of 1113 Muslim respondents aged 15-30 from the beginning of 2010 in the report called House of War from The Danish School at Aarhus, carried out by researchers Marco Goli (associate professor at Metropol) and Shahamak Rezaei (associate professor at Roskilde University), describes radicalisation and splits Muslims residing in Denmark into four groups:
The Seculars (49,4 percent), the Fundamentalists (27 percent), the Rebellious (18 percent), and the Radicalised (5,6 percent). The first group being quiet Muslims integrated and integrating their faith into norms and laws of the country. The Fundamentalists as taking their faith deeply serious, but not by use of extreme measures. The Rebellious group as being simply lost and frustrated young Muslims who find an outlet for their frustrations in sympathy for militant islamist groups, but do not actually support militant actions. And then the last group of the Radicalised and militant Muslims, who use Islam as a vehicle for extreme and expressive measures.
Surprisingly, the ratio of the most radicalised groups is not found in the Copenhagen area, but in suburbs like Høje Taastrup West of Copenhagen, and in Kalundborg at the Northwestern tip of the island of Sealand. And with respect to their ethnic backgrounds, they are more likely of Somalian and Lebanese/Palestinian origin, than of Iranian/Iraqian origin. They are often born in either Denmark or 3rd country, other than country of origin.
They have no shortage of so-called 'economic capital', since overrepresented in high income groups. With respect to 'cultural capital', more often than other groups they have lower or medium education, rather than higher education. They have stronger attachments to local imams, and condemn muslims who convert to other religions. Although, paradoxically, they are underrepresented among the groups in longing for and visiting their countries of origin - the so-called Diaspora explanation.
The Radicalised are often singles, middle children in the family. But in contradiction to widespread perception, they are not solitude, but rather spend the same amount of time with friends, also cross-culturally with other Danes. They are very fluent in Danish. They also more frequently have ethnic Danish partners. So the study finds no evidence that the group of Radicalised have a shortage of so-called 'social capital' compared with the other three groups. As the CTA report confirms, they are also frequent social media users.
The House of War report does not conclude on the radicalisation process. It describes various factors. A yes and no verification, that is summed up in the double edged question: Do people become more radicalized because they go to the Mosque more often? Or do they go to the Mosque more often, because they submit a radical interpretation of Islam? A paradox a bit like the one about the hen and the egg.
So here's today's paradox for you. To be coined at Paradoxical News as The Anti-Social Socials Paradox: How come that basically social Muslims turn to highly anti-social measures?
For further information, please see:
http://www.pet.dk/upload/youtube_og_facebook_-_de_nye_radikaliseringsværktøjer.pdf
http://magenta.ruc.dk/isg/nyheder/30082295/doc/
In Denmark, another study of 1113 Muslim respondents aged 15-30 from the beginning of 2010 in the report called House of War from The Danish School at Aarhus, carried out by researchers Marco Goli (associate professor at Metropol) and Shahamak Rezaei (associate professor at Roskilde University), describes radicalisation and splits Muslims residing in Denmark into four groups:
The Seculars (49,4 percent), the Fundamentalists (27 percent), the Rebellious (18 percent), and the Radicalised (5,6 percent). The first group being quiet Muslims integrated and integrating their faith into norms and laws of the country. The Fundamentalists as taking their faith deeply serious, but not by use of extreme measures. The Rebellious group as being simply lost and frustrated young Muslims who find an outlet for their frustrations in sympathy for militant islamist groups, but do not actually support militant actions. And then the last group of the Radicalised and militant Muslims, who use Islam as a vehicle for extreme and expressive measures.
Surprisingly, the ratio of the most radicalised groups is not found in the Copenhagen area, but in suburbs like Høje Taastrup West of Copenhagen, and in Kalundborg at the Northwestern tip of the island of Sealand. And with respect to their ethnic backgrounds, they are more likely of Somalian and Lebanese/Palestinian origin, than of Iranian/Iraqian origin. They are often born in either Denmark or 3rd country, other than country of origin.
They have no shortage of so-called 'economic capital', since overrepresented in high income groups. With respect to 'cultural capital', more often than other groups they have lower or medium education, rather than higher education. They have stronger attachments to local imams, and condemn muslims who convert to other religions. Although, paradoxically, they are underrepresented among the groups in longing for and visiting their countries of origin - the so-called Diaspora explanation.
The Radicalised are often singles, middle children in the family. But in contradiction to widespread perception, they are not solitude, but rather spend the same amount of time with friends, also cross-culturally with other Danes. They are very fluent in Danish. They also more frequently have ethnic Danish partners. So the study finds no evidence that the group of Radicalised have a shortage of so-called 'social capital' compared with the other three groups. As the CTA report confirms, they are also frequent social media users.
The House of War report does not conclude on the radicalisation process. It describes various factors. A yes and no verification, that is summed up in the double edged question: Do people become more radicalized because they go to the Mosque more often? Or do they go to the Mosque more often, because they submit a radical interpretation of Islam? A paradox a bit like the one about the hen and the egg.
So here's today's paradox for you. To be coined at Paradoxical News as The Anti-Social Socials Paradox: How come that basically social Muslims turn to highly anti-social measures?
For further information, please see:
http://www.pet.dk/upload/youtube_og_facebook_-_de_nye_radikaliseringsværktøjer.pdf
http://magenta.ruc.dk/isg/nyheder/30082295/doc/